Introduction
Policies such as the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and the Medicaid Health Insurance Program in the US have targeted low-income families with children as priority recipients of government assistance. In Canada, the Canada Child Tax Benefit and the National Child Benefit (NCB) have similarly been designed to provide assistance primarily for families with children. Along with the goal of providing assistance to these families, both the EITC and the NCB have also been designed to encourage parents to participate in the labour force, with the long-term objective of helping these families provide for themselves instead of receiving transfers.
This type of 'welfare to work' tax credit typically focuses on the working poor, rather than the very poorest in society. Some of this emphasis derives from a concern about the efficiency cost of transfers to the poor.
1 While the poorest may be the most deserving, the loss of output generated by making transfers to them could exceed the value to society of the redistribution. Other motivations for these policies include broader measures of the costs of large transfers to non-workers, such as the effects of long-run dependency and stigmatization. Recently, Saez (2002) has shown that earnings subsidies to the working poor are preferred to direct transfers to the poorest when the extensive labour market margin is more elastic. The result comes from the high marginal tax rates that accompany direct transfers, as the high tax-back rates serve to discourage any labour market participation 1 See Immervoll et al. (forthcoming) for an extensive discussion of the efficiency-equity tradeoff in the context of child benefits. 2 Ventry (2000) provides a detailed history of the political and economic debates that have accompanied the introduction and growth of the EITC in the United States.
is its integration with social assistance (welfare) payments. Some provinces agreed to subtract the federally-paid National Child Benefit Supplement benefits from provinciallyprovided social assistance payments. This structure allowed former welfare recipients to carry part of their total social assistance payments with them into the work force, effectively lowering the 'welfare wall' of high tax rates that faces welfare recipients.
Other provinces chose not to deduct the new federal benefit from recipients' social assistance cheques, meaning that the National Child Benefit did not directly affect the welfare wall. As a result, we have a large and transparent source of identifying variation on which to base our estimates. In addition to the integration of benefits, several provinces introduced small earned income supplements as part of the National Child Benefit program. Using this variation, we are able to compare the relative efficacy of these two methods of improving labour market incentives.
We calculate the federal and provincial benefits available to each family in our data using a detailed tax and benefit simulator for the Canadian tax system. This allows us to directly estimate the marginal effects of changes in the NCB on labour force participation, social assistance receipt, hours worked, total earnings, and social assistance dollars. The continuity of the measures available offers an improvement over an approach that simply compares outcomes across discrete test and control groups.
Our findings suggest that there were strong labour market effects from the integration of child benefits with welfare for single mothers. An additional $1,000 in benefits deducted from social assistance payments is associated with a 3.4 to 4.7
percentage point decrease in social assistance take-up, and a 3.3 to 4.6 percentage point increase in having worked. Evidence for earnings and weeks of work on the intensive margin is much weaker, with no strong evidence of a response. Both of these findings are consistent with theory and the previous literature. Further, we find less evidence for an effect of the provincial earned income benefit programs on work incentives. We speculate that this may be related to the relative visibility of the earned income benefits versus the social assistance integration.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 explains the National Child
Benefit Program in detail. Section 3 presents our empirical strategy; section 4 describes the data sets and tax information used in our analyses. Sections 5 and 6 present our results, and section 7 concludes.
The National Child Benefit Program
The National Child Benefit (NCB) program was introduced in July, 1998 as a component of the Canada Child Tax Benefit. The NCB encompasses two programs, a federally-provided refundable tax-credit (called the National Child Benefit Supplement -NCB Supplement) and provincially-provided initiatives. The stated goals of the program were to reduce child poverty, promote attachment to the labour force, and reduce overlap between federal and provincial initiatives (Department of Finance 1997) . Unlike programs such as the EITC, the integration and combination of benefits in the National
Child Benefit program provides assistance not just to working families but also to nonworking families. However, the net effect of the program in many provinces was similar to the EITC -it provided a subsidy to enter the labour force.
The annual benefit amount in 1998 was $605 for the first child, $405 for the second, and $330 for the third and additional children. The benefits are reduced with family income, starting at a threshold of $20,921 (for 1998) . 3 The reduction rates were set such that the benefit would be reduced to zero when income reached $25,921 for all family sizes. 4 For example, starting in 1998 a family with 2 children and income of $25,000 would receive $186.04 annually ($1,010 for two children; reduced by 20.2% of $4,079).
Figure 1 traces out the benefits as a function of family income. Importantly for our empirical strategy, the incentive to work (so long as income is less than $25,921) differs sharply by the number of children. In 2002-03, the federal government spent $7.8 billion on the Canada Child Tax Benefit. This amount represented a real increase of 32 percent over the amount spent in 1997-1998. 5 Most of this increase was a result of the introduction and subsequent expansions of the NCB Supplement.
At a province's discretion, the NCB Supplement benefits could be integrated with provincial social assistance programs by deducting the NCB Supplement from social assistance payments dollar for dollar. Five of the ten provinces (Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, Ontario, Manitoba, and Alberta) chose to integrate their benefits in this way.
We designate these five provinces as the 'clawback' provinces.
For the provinces that did not subtract the NCB from social assistance payments, more clarification is necessary. The simplest cases are New Brunswick and Newfoundland, which did not deduct NCB payments at all. 6 More complicated are the 3 In this paper, we refer to the reduction of benefits with higher family income as a 'reduction,' while we label the reduction of social assistance resulting from the integration of benefits under the NCB as a 'clawback.' In Canadian policy discussions, both are sometimes referred to as 'clawbacks.' To maintain clarity, we reserve the term 'clawback' to refer to the reduction of social assistance benefits with the NCB. 4 The reduction rates in 1998 were 12.1% for one child, 20.2 % for two children, and 26.8% for three children. 5 The dollar amounts are taken from the Public Accounts of Canada (Receiver General of Canada 2003) . 6 A small social assistance reduction in 1999 accompanied the introduction of the Newfoundland and Labrador Child Benefit. This makes it somewhat like the cases of Quebec, Saskatchewan, and British Columbia. More detail is provided in the Appendix.
cases of Quebec, Saskatchewan, and British Columbia. In these three provinces, provincial child benefits (rather than social assistance) are reduced to account for the NCB. Moreover, around the same time these three provinces instituted social assistance reforms that lowered rates. The net effect of these policies may be similar to the NCB, but in order to maintain our focus on the NCB we designate these provinces as 'no clawback' provinces since the social assistance amounts are not directly reduced by NCB expansions. Our empirical strategy, however, will check to ensure that these provinces are not confounding our estimates of the effect of the NCB. Specifically, we try including controls that fully account for the social assistance and other child benefit changes introduced over the same time period. More detail on the child benefit policies is provided in the Appendix.
Provincially-provided initiatives comprise the second part of the National Child
Benefit program. The initiatives included both spending programs and provincial tax credit programs. The spending programs provided funding for child-care subsidies and health promotion programs, while the tax credits took the form of straight transfers or earned income credits. The provincial credits also affect and provide variation in incentives to work. For example, Ontario provides a Child Care Supplement for Working
Families. In 2000, families must have at least $5,000 of earnings to qualify, and the yearly benefits were $1,100 + $210 (per child under the age of seven) if the family is a single parent family. Benefits are then clawed back starting at $20,000 of family income.
While much of our analysis focuses on the NCB Supplement, we do incorporate the provincial programs into our analysis as they also provide work incentives to mothers.
Our analysis therefore allows us to compare the NCB Supplement integration with social assistance to the more EITC-like provincial programs. As these programs differ in both size and method of delivery, contrasting the two may provide some insight into the relative efficacy of each program structure.
In addition to the earned income benefits, several provinces and the federal government provide a basic level of child benefits that is not tied to employment earnings. As well, there are non-cash programs such as childcare subsidies and health programs provided by the provinces under the NCB. We discuss how these benefits and programs relate to our empirical strategy in Section 3.
Because of our focus on social assistance recipients, a brief overview of social assistance in Canada is warranted. 7 All provinces in Canada operate separate social assistance programs for low-income families. There is considerable variation in both asset tests for eligibility and earnings exemptions by province. For example, in 2002, families in Newfoundland were allowed an earnings exemption of $150, while families in
Ontario were entitled to $346 plus a percentage of net earnings that varied by family size.
The family asset exemption in Ontario for a one-child family was $1,530, while in Saskatchewan the same size family was entitled to $3,000 of assets. The unweighted mean of yearly welfare income (including all benefits, both federal and provincial) for a couple with two children in 2002 was $18,147 with a standard deviation of $848. There is a small but positive correlation between the generosity of the provincial social assistance program and the probability that a province choose to claw back its benefits with the NCB. Our empirical approach (described in Section 3) accounts for these differences across provinces, and any change in these differences over time.
Labour Market Incentives
The integration of social assistance benefits under the NCB produces a strong incentive to join the labour market. 8 Figure 2 presents a static labour supply model with a stylized social assistance benefit. With no work, an individual receives social assistance in the amount of AB. Between B and C, extra work results in a dollar-for-dollar decrease in the social assistance benefit -the 100 percent marginal tax rate often called the welfare wall. 9 At C, the social assistance benefit is exhausted and earnings lead to increased consumption until point D. The standard result is represented by points X 0 and B. In the absence of social assistance, someone with the preferences embodied in the utility curves in the figure would prefer to be at point X 0 . With social assistance, point B is preferred, however, and the individual chooses no work.
The line segments EFG represent the change in incentives introduced by the integration of social assistance benefits under the NCB program. Because the 100 percent tax rate now ends earlier at point E, the individual keeps more of his or her earnings for work between points E and G. This may lead the individual to prefer a point such as X 1 instead of point B, meaning that the individual would join the labour force. were already in the labour market when the benefit was introduced. For some of them, the parallel shift of the budget constraint out to EF delivers a work-reducing income effect.
For those on the FG segment, both the income and the substitution effects lead to less 8 Hotz and Scholz (2003) provide a thorough treatment of the static labour supply incentives in the EITC. Meyer (2002) shows evidence suggesting the response is much stronger on the extensive margin. 9 As noted above, provincial social assistance programs allow small amounts of income to be earned before social assistance is taxed back. This "set aside" may cause some individuals to prefer to work only small amounts. Figure 2 shows a basic model without this feature, although the main implications of the model are unchanged.
work. Finally, for those operating to the left of point G, there is no change in incentives as the benefit is zero because of their high income.
In addition, the same figure can be used to think about the transfers and spending programs that do not condition on labour market attachment. These benefits are expected to diminish the incentive to work by extending the distance between A and B.
In total, the NCB program provides clear incentives to join the work force for families currently on social assistance by partially replacing social assistance with a benefit that, on net, is only received if working. In addition, the provincially-run earned income supplements provide more incentive to join the labour force. However, in both cases, the prediction for work on the intensive margin is unclear -those already working may face higher marginal tax rates on their labour so they may choose to work less.
Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy relies on differences in benefit levels across groups to identify the effects of the NCB Supplement on female labour supply decisions. While an advantage of this methodology is the transparency of the source of identification, we are not able to incorporate the kinks and twists in the budget constraint generated by child benefit policies as would be the case in structural model of behaviour. However, we believe that our method is fruitful for answering a relatively direct policy question about a small change in benefit incentives within the existing system. Specifically, provincial spending programs under the NCB typically do not discriminate based on the number of children in the family. Since our strategy compares women with different numbers of children within provinces, the NCB spending programs shouldn't affect our estimates. Similarly, if there are other labour market policies we do not consider in our empirical model that vary at the province-year level, our estimates will not be affected so long as the excluded policy affects everyone in a given province in a given year in the same way. To the extent that provincial programs do vary over time 11 The different benefit measures we use are discussed in detail later in the paper. 12 Alternatively conceived, identification comes from comparing across years within province-number-ofchildren, or across provinces within year-number-of-children.
and across number-of-children, this may bias our results. 13 Finally, if provinces' policy choices were correlated with social assistance take-up rates, political endogeneity might affect our estimates. However, with the province-year controls included, this is only a concern to the extent that the policy decisions reflected the differential trends in social assistance among families of different sizes within a province.
A key assumption underlying this approach is the exogeneity of the province of residence, year, and number of children. For the province, this assumption would be violated if individuals switched provinces in order to benefit from different incentive structures. We consider this possibility unlikely, as the benefits are unlikely to surpass the costs of moving.
14 The number of children may also be influenced by benefits. Assuming that children are exogenous to benefits is standard in the EITC literature in the US (see Hotz and Scholz 2003) , but the assumption may be violated if fertility decisions depend on fiscal incentives. Milligan (2005) found strong evidence that fertility did respond to fiscal incentives in Quebec's Allowance for Newborn Children program in the late 80s
and early 90s, but found much less evidence of a response among women more likely to be at-risk for being on welfare.
We pursue two strategies to account for the possibility of endogenous fertility.
First, we present our results using only the province-year variation in the benefits, finding results consistent with those that also incorporate the variation induced by the number of children. Second, we also present results excluding children under age 6. Since the NCB program was introduced in 1998 and our data run only until 2000, the decision to have the older children clearly preceded the introduction of the program and therefore could not have been influenced by its incentives.
Some of our dependent variables are binary, so our estimation uses a linear probability model. Blundell and Powell (2004) compare a semi-parametric control function approach to linear probability and probit results, finding the parametric models estimate a slope that is too steep. Their method requires a parsimonious set of covariates in order to be tractable, so it is not appropriate for our policy framework which requires a large set of controls to isolate the policy effect. However, their findings may suggest some caution in the interpretation of our results.
Endogeneity of benefits
The observed benefit depends on the province, year, number of children, and income of the family. Importantly, family income is determined by many of the outcomes we intend to study as regressands, such as earnings, hours, and weeks worked. This introduces a mechanical endogeneity between observed benefits and the measures of labour supply.
To overcome the endogeneity problem, we implement an instrumental variables strategy similar to one pioneered by Currie and Gruber (1996) . The essence of the strategy is to form an instrument that simulates benefits using only the exogenous determinants of benefits. As no particular family's income influences the simulated benefit, the mechanical endogeneity is purged. Because the system is exactly identified, no overidentification tests are possible. Instead, the credibility of the instrument strategy rests on the plausibility of the assumed exogeneity of the determinants of benefits.
In our case, we argued earlier that the province of residence, year, and number of children are exogenous components. To form our instrument, we take a sample of families and calculate the benefits for each province-year-number of children combination. The simulation sample is a 10 percent random sample of the families in our five years of SLID data. As we have 5 years of data, 10 provinces, and 4 family sizes (0 to 3 children), this means that we must perform 200 benefit simulations for each family in the simulation sample. Importantly, the same set of families is put through the benefit calculator for each province-year-children combination, meaning that the benefits calculated in each cell do not embody differences in income or other characteristics across cells. The mean benefit over the simulation sample of families in each cell is then matched back to the original dataset by province, year and number of children to be used as the instrument. It can be expected to predict well each family's benefit, but will not depend on a particular family's observed labour market outcomes. The process is repeated over province-year cells to form our province-year simulated instrument.
Data
We use the Census Family and the The benefit calculations are made using the observed income information on each woman, along with information on the province of residence, year, and number of children. Using a tax and benefit simulator, we calculate the child benefits owing to each woman under federal and provincial refundable tax credit programs. We use the output of the simulator to form the policy variables used in the study. Our primary policy variable of interest we call NCBSCLAW. It is calculated by multiplying the NCB Supplement payment owed to the family by a dummy variable for the five 'clawback' provinces that reduce social assistance by the amount of the NCB Supplement payments.
We form the instruments described earlier in the paper using the same tax simulator. After putting our sample of families through the simulator, we select those who had positive employment earnings and take the average value of the benefit variables 16 Those under 18 are typically not eligible for social assistance. Those over 50 have few children. 17 Married women are much less likely to be on social assistance. In our sample, 4.2 per cent of married women have some social assistance income compared to 16.5 per cent of single women. Among women with children, 43.5 percent of single women are on social assistance while only 4.4 percent of married women are. Moreover, the husband's income pushes most married women over the income threshold ($25,921 in 1998) at which all NCB Supplement benefits are gone. In our simulated benefits, 74.7 percent of single mothers receive some NCB Supplement while only 17.8 percent of married mothers do.
by province-year and by province-year-child cells. 18 For the province-year cells, we exclude families without children from the calculation. For the province-year-children cells, we assign each family in the simulation 0 through 3 children in turn, so that we can get a benefit measure for the same set of families for all family sizes. The resulting benefits represent an exogenous measure of what benefits a working family could expect to receive given its province, year, and family size.
The outcomes we study in our analysis include four binary variables of labour market behaviour and five continuous measures of the intensity of work. We have a binary variable for any receipt of social assistance and one for having any earnings. These dummies are relatively blunt tools, as even a small amount of income will turn the outcome variable to a one. A more subtle measure is also provided in the SLID that indicates the 'major' source of income for the family. 19 We form a dummy for having government transfers as the major source of income, and a dummy for earnings as the major source of income. The continuous measures include earnings, social assistance income, total income, hours worked, and weeks worked. All of these are measured over the calendar year in question. More than half of single women with three or more children show some social assistance 18 We exclude families without positive earners because we want to measure the incentive to be in the labour force. The instrument would still work including all zero wage earners, but its predictive power would be reduced. 19 The major source of income variable is provided by the SLID. Across several income categories (earned income, pensions, government transfers, etc.), the major source is defined as the category with the highest level of income.
income, and 55.7 percent of them have transfers as the major source of income. Still, more than 63 percent of them have some earnings in the year.
More descriptive statistics are provided in 1998, and fully in place for 1999 and 2000. The observed differences across provinces partially reflect cross-provincial differences in characteristics such as income and number of children. Our IV strategy will discard these differences and focus on the policy variation. The discussion of the other policy variables is deferred until Section 6 when the results for those variables are presented.
Main Results
To begin our analysis of results, we generate graphs of some of our labour market outcome variables through time. We then report results for OLS regression that do not account for the mechanical endogeneity of benefits with work in order to motivate the need for our instrumental variables strategy. Next, we present results for NCBSCLAW using our IV strategy based on province-year cells, followed by a similar strategy that allows for variation in the number of children. Finally, we show the sensitivity of our results to several alternative sample selection criteria.
Graphs of dependent variables through time
Figures 3 through 6 graph our binary outcomes variables for provinces that claw back the NCB Supplement from social assistance and for those that did not. Figure 3 shows the proportion of women with children having positive social assistance income. Before 1998, when there was no NCB Supplement, social assistance receipt was trending downward in both sets of provinces, possibly reflecting improving national labour market conditions. After 1998, social assistance receipt in the clawback provinces drops below that seen in the no-clawback provinces, consistent with people moving from welfare to work following the NCB Supplement incentives. 
OLS Results
Our main regression results are reported in Table 4 . We report the coefficient on NCBSCLAW, scaled in $1,000s of dollars. This means that the estimated coefficient represents the predicted change in the outcome variable when $1,000 more NCB Supplement is clawed back from social assistance. All reported standard errors are corrected by clustering on the level of aggregation of the benefit variable, which in some cases is province-year cells and for others is province-year-children cells.
The first column reports OLS regression results of the outcome variables on NCBSCLAW and the set of control variables for the sample of single mothers. For each regression, we only report the coefficient on the benefit variable. Since benefit levels first rise with earnings and then later fall for those with higher family income, the predicted sign for the estimated coefficients is unclear -those with zero benefits could be women who did not work at all or they could be women who earned very much and saw their benefits completely clawed back. Correspondingly, the estimated coefficients are hard to interpret. The estimated coefficient on social assistance receipt is 0.171, suggesting a 17.1 percentage point increase in receipt when benefits increase by $1,000. Having positive earnings, however, is predicted to decrease by 8.9 percentage points. High earning women have their benefits completely clawed back because of their higher family income, so high earners tend to have no benefits. This mechanical endogeneity demonstrates the difficulties inherent in using observed in-work benefit amounts to study labour market behaviour.
IV Results
To correct for this endogeneity, we turn to our first set of IV estimates in the second column. Here, we maintain our focus on women with children. As an instrument for To put these estimates in context, consider a woman with one child contemplating the welfare or work decision. On welfare, assume that she would receive $850 per month, or $10,200 annually. If she worked at an $8 per hour job for 40 hours per week for 52 weeks, she would earn $16,640; an increment of $6,440 over social assistance. A thousand dollar increase in NCBSCLAW would imply that the increment to income from choosing work would increase by 15.5 percent to $7,440. Using our estimate for 'earnings as a major source' of 14.9 percent, the implied elasticity in this example is 0.96 (14.9 percent / 15.5 percent). In the US literature on the EITC, Hotz and Scholz (2003) conclude that the range of credibly estimated elasticities is between 0.69 and 1.16, so, our estimate lies comfortably in that range.
The continuous labour supply measures show a mixed response. The point estimate on earnings is quite high -suggesting that earnings increase by $988 for a $1,000 increase in integrated benefits, although the standard error is quite large. Total income, however, does not show a strong response. Finally, we estimate an increase in hours worked of 85.8 but no significant increase in weeks worked.
For social assistance, the estimated effect of making another thousand dollars subject to integration is a decrease of $658. This result is composed of two effects. First, some families move from social assistance to work and therefore no longer collect any social assistance. Second, for those who stay on social assistance, the dollar-for-dollar claw-back of social assistance income also leads to a mechanical decrease in social assistance income when NCBSCLAW increases. Because not all women in the sample are on social assistance, we shouldn't expect the dollar-for-dollar claw-back to result in a coefficient of -1,000.0.
In the third column we expand the sample to include single women without children. We form the instrument for this sample by using the same province-year cells as before, but now include benefits at zero for the childless families. Because the childless single women live in the same province and act in the same labour markets but do not receive any benefits, these women serve as a control for unobserved factors (such as labour market conditions or other policies) in each province-year location. We include dummies for having no children, as well as second order interactions of having no children with province and year effects. In such a specification, the policy effect is therefore identified by differences in labour supply between childless women and women with children in any given province-year combination.
For the binary labour market indicators, the point estimates are generally larger when we include the childless women in column (3). Welfare receipt is now predicted to decrease by 4.7 percentage points for a $1,000 increase in integrated benefits. The positive earnings indicator is also statistically significant, with a point estimate of 4.6 percentage points.
The continuous measures of labour supply lie beneath. The estimated effect on earnings is still statistically insignificant, but the point estimate is now negative. This may indicate that the previous large positive estimate was simply picking up trends in earnings across provincial labour markets or some other unobserved factor. Social assistance income is still strongly negative, with an estimated average crowd out of $704 for each $1,000 in integrated benefits. Total income increases by about $1,000 although the standard error is relatively large. The impact on hours work is not precisely estimated.
Finally, in the fourth column of the table we use a more flexible instrument that allows for variation in the benefit corresponding to the number of children in the family. While this contributes more identifying variation, it could be argued that the variation is not exogenous; that the number of children might respond to the benefits incentive. We examine this possibility later in this section. The point estimates in this column are very similar to the previous specification, but more precisely measured in most cases.
Using the estimated coefficient for social assistance receipt of -4.7 and -3.4
percentage points from columns (3) and (4), we can assess the magnitude of the contribution of the NCB Supplement integration to the overall downward trend in social assistance receipt. We take 1997 as the base year as it is the last full year before the NCB was introduced. Sample Sensitivity Checks 22 The calculation produces a similar result using 1996 as the base year.
To assess the sensitivity of our results to some of our assumptions, we present the results for alternative samples in Table 5 . For the results in column (2), we identify a population that we might expect to have a larger response and see if it is so. Women with children under age six have much greater childcare demands than those of school-going age. For this reason, the responsiveness of mothers with young children may be limited.
Restricting the sample to women with children at least 6 years old also helps as a robustness check against the possibility that fertility may be endogenous. Children aged six or more were born before the NCB policy was contemplated, so can be considered exogenous to the policy. Compared to the base results, the restricted sample has much larger coefficients. The coefficient on having positive social assistance income, for example, more than triples to -0.117.
In the third column, we try another restriction for a sample we think may be more responsive. Most women over age 24 will have completed their education, while a large proportion of women in their late teens are still potentially in school. By selecting a sample of women more active in the labour market, we expect to see a higher sensitivity to the incentives in the NCB. We find point estimates that are statistically indistinguishable from the base case, although they are uniformly larger. Taken together with the results in column 2, the results appear to vary sensibly in suitably chosen subsamples.
The final column of Table 5 shows the results excluding Quebec. Because Quebec has many different policies than the rest of the country, it is informative to check if the results depend particularly on the differences between Quebec and the rest of Canada.
Although the results for having positive social assistance and positive earnings are slightly less statistically significant, the balance of the results suggest that Quebec alone is not driving our results.
Results including other policy variables
Contemporaneous with the introduction of the NCB Supplement and the integration with social assistance payments, several provinces introduced new child benefit programs as well as other changes to social assistance. In addition, there were changes at the federal benefit level over our sample period. The impact of any of these policy changes on the labour market behaviour of single women is of interest on its own. However, it is of particular interest here because other policy changes may be confounding our findings for the integration of social assistance payments through the NCB program. In this section,
we pursue analysis of all of the policy changes mentioned above.
The first additional policy variable we create is WORKBENS. This variable records the benefits of earned income credits that are available only to those who work. The province-year variation in these policy variables can be seen in Table 3 . For WORKBENS in 1996 and 1997, the federal Working Income Supplement was in effect.
The amounts vary in the table by province because of differing income levels -our instrumental variables strategy removes this income variation leaving no identifying information from the Working Income Supplement. For the last three years, residents of New Brunswick, Quebec, Ontario, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia were eligible for earned income supplements. 23 For the automatic benefits, the policy variation comes from small provincial credits under the NCB program, as well as the introduction of the NCB Supplement for the no claw-back provinces. Quebec's introduction of the Family Allowance in 1997 can also clearly be seen. Finally, statutory social assistance payments changed little over this period, with the observed within-province variation mostly reflecting differing price-indexation across provinces and differences in family composition across cells. Two exceptions are Saskatchewan, which lowered social assistance payments in 1998, and Quebec which lowered them between 1996 and 1997, as part of their reforms of child benefits.
In Table 6 , we present evidence using the alternative benefit measures to gauge the importance of other provincially-varying benefits versus the NCB Supplement. In all cases we use the same specification as column (4) of Table 4 , exploiting child, year, and provincial variation. For WORKBENS and AUTOBENS we use the same IV strategy as we used for NCBSCLAW to predict benefits, but for PROVSA we simply use the statutory benefit rates available to the family as the policy variable.
23 New Brunswick's earned income credit was introduced in 1997 and Quebec's in 1989 -both before the NCB. Details on all programs are provided in the Appendix.
The results in Table 6 use each of the policy variables in isolation, and then combine them together in the fifth column. The first column uses NCBSCLAW and so reproduces the results from the previous table. The second column uses WORKBENS. Higher provincial in-work benefits provide an incentive to work very similar to the EITC. The estimates are much less precise than for NCBSCLAW, meaning that it is difficult to find significant coefficients. This imprecision results from the limited size and variation of the benefits aggregated into WORKBENS. For both of the major source variables, WORKBENS shows a very strong and statistically significant response. However, this may be simply picking up the impact of other policy variables that are correlated with WORKBENS -a possibility we check below.
The third column uses the AUTOBENS variable. Because receiving more benefits not conditional on earnings decreases the incentive to work, we expect to find opposite signs than we found for the first two columns. The results do show the expected sign pattern, with both of the 'major source' variables showing strongly significant coefficients.
The effect of provincial social assistance rates is estimated to be strong and positive for having any social assistance income. However, the other three point estimates are uniformly close to zero, although imprecisely estimated. The lack of strong variation in provincial social assistance rates over this period may contribute to these weak findings.
The final column puts all four policy variables in the same regression. Importantly, this allows us to check whether the inferences for NCBSCLAW have been confounded by the other social assistance and child benefit reforms ongoing during this period. For three of the four dependent variables, the point estimate and significance level for NCBSCLAW is stronger in column (4) than in column (1), suggesting that other provincial programs omitted from the regressions are not driving what we saw in the main results. The estimates for AUTOBENS and PROVSA are significant for having any social assistance income, but insignificant for the other three dependent variables. The only variable with a systematic relationship across the different dependent variables is NCBSCLAW.
From this evidence we draw two conclusions; one strong and one more tentative. The stronger conclusion is that our main results on the impact of the integration of NCB benefits with social assistance are not driven by these other policies. The more tentative conclusion is that integration is a more effective policy than earned income credits or lower social assistance payments in increasing work among single females. While some of the point estimates for WORKBENS are large, the imprecision of the estimates renders it difficult to make any definitive conclusion.
One potential explanation for the stronger effect of the NCB clawback compared to earned income credits is that the NCB Supplement is directly subtracted from the recipients' monthly social assistance cheque. Recipients are therefore made well aware that they must work to receive additional benefits. On the other hand, the provincial programs are often administered separately, or through tax returns, and while the incentive structure may be similar, recipients may not be as aware of potential work incentives and crowd-out effects. Previous work has documented the relationship between take-up and the visibility of the program (Currie, 2004) . In the case of the NCB individuals need not apply separately for the federal and provincial programs, and as such differential take-up is not driving differences here. However, the transparency of the mechanisms by which the programs promote workforce participation does differ and transparency arguments may indeed explain part of the differential effects on labour supply. It may also be that the NCB documentation provided to recipients made it abundantly clear that recipients would not lose benefits through working. 24 However, we can not directly test these explanations.
Conclusions
In this paper, we study the introduction of the National Child Benefit program in Canada in 1998. Because some provinces chose to subtract the benefits from their social assistance programs and some did not, cross-province variation in the incentives to leave social assistance were introduced. We exploit these differences and find a large, statistically and economically significant effect on social assistance take-up and work.
The magnitude of the effects we estimate are within the range of those found in the EITC literature in the United States. Our estimates suggest that between 19 to 27 percent of the total decline in social assistance receipt among single mothers can be accounted for by the integration of social assistance payments with the NCB supplement. Saez (2002) stresses the importance of differentiating between the extensive and the intensive elasticities when evaluating labour market incentives. His optimal tax model recommends a benefit with a smaller transfer and an earnings exemption before receiving any benefit when the extensive elasticity is large, and a benefit with larger transfers and clawbacks starting at very low incomes when the extensive elasticity is less responsive.
In the context of this model, the large extensive elasticities that we estimate may provide some justification for the integration of benefits under the NCB, as the integration effectively acts as an earnings exemption, with benefits received only by those who are working. As this is a feature of the NCB found neither in the EITC in the United States 24 We thank a referee for making this point.
nor the WFTC in the United Kingdom, the experience in Canada can help inform policy aimed at targeting support in other jurisdictions.
Appendix -Details on Child Benefits
Below we provide details on the federal and provincial child benefits we include in our tax calculator. The discussion is split between the in-work benefits and the automatic benefits. Unless otherwise stated, the description applies to the year 2000. In all cases, the family income measure used to reduce benefits is from line 236 of the federal tax form, which is net family income (total income less deductions).
In-work Benefits
Below we describe some details of the provincial in-work benefits available in certain provinces. With the exception of New Brunswick and Quebec, all of the programs were introduced in 1998. The income used for the phase-in is a measure of earned income, and income for the benefit reduction is the "line 236" net family income measure from the federal tax form.
Federal Goods and Services Tax Supplement: 1991
A credit of $106 is phased in at a rate of 2 percent for income over $6,546. Only childless single adults are eligible. It is reduced along with the Goods and Services Tax Credit at a rate of 5 percent for income over $26,284.
Federal Working Income Supplement: 1993
This credit paid benefits of $500 until 1996 and $605, $405, and $330 for one, two and three children in 1997. It was phased in at a rate of 8 per cent for income higher than $3,750, and reduced at a rate of 10 percent for family income over $20,921. It was cancelled in 1998.
New Brunswick Working Income Supplement: 1997
For each dollar of earned income over $3,750, a family with children receives 4 cents more Working Income Supplement up to a maximum of $250. Family income over $20,921 reduces the Supplement by 5 cents until it is completely gone.
Quebec Parental Wage Assistance: 1989
This program pre-dates the NCB initiative by a number of years. For 1999-2000, single families received 35 cents for every dollar earned over $1,200 per month, and then reduced by 43 cents for every dollar of income over $7,790 per month for singles and $11,370 per month for couples.
Ontario Child Care Supplement for Working Families: 1998
Benefits increase with earned income over $5,000 by 21 cents per dollar for one child under age 7, 42 cents for two children under 7, and 63 cents for three or more children under 7. The maximum benefit is $1,100 for single families and $1,310 for married families. For income greater than $20,000, the benefit is decreased by 8 cents per dollar of family income.
Saskatchewan Employment Supplement: 1998
The benefit is zero until $1,500 of earned income. For earnings greater than $1,500, the benefits are increased by 25 to 45 cents per dollar, depending on the number of children.
The maximum benefit is $2,100 for the first child, plus $420 for each additional child. The income threshold is $12,900 and the reduction rate is 25 cents per dollar of earnings over the threshold.
Alberta Family Employment Tax Credit: 1998
The benefit pays up to $500 to families with one child and up to $1000 for families with two children. The benefit starts when earned income reaches $6,500 and rise by 8 cents per dollar of income over the threshold. They begin to be reduced at $25,000 at a rate of 4 cents per dollar.
British Columbia Earned Income Benefit: 1998
The benefit pays up to $605 for the first child, $405 for the second, and $330 for the third and fourth child. The benefit is clawed in between $3,750 and $10,000 at the rate necessary to ensure the maximum benefit is reached at $10,000. The benefit is reduced for income over $20,921 at 12.1% for one child, 20.2% for two children, and 26.8% for three children.
Automatic Benefits

Federal Goods and Services Tax Credit
The benefit pays $202 per adult and $106 per child. It is reduced with family income at a rate of 5 percent in excess of $26,284.
Federal Canada Child Tax Benefit
The benefit pays up to $1,104 per child. It is reduced with family income at a rate of 2.5 percent for one child and 5 percent for two or more children for family income in excess of $26,284.
Newfoundland and Labrador Child Benefit: 1999
The benefit pays $204 for one child, an additional $312 for a second child, $336 for the third child, and $360 for a fourth or subsequent child. It is reduced by family income in excess of $15,921 until the income level of $20,921 when it is exhausted. This benefit was introduced along with a social assistance reform that reduced rates.
Nova Scotia Child Benefit: 1998
The benefit pays $403 for one child, an additional $319 for a second child, and $286 for a third or subsequent child. It is reduced with family income in excess of $16,000 until the income level of $20,921 when it is exhausted.
New Brunswick Child Tax Benefit: 1997
The benefit pays $250 per child. It is reduced at a rate of 2.5 percent for one child or 5 percent for two or more children for family incomes in excess of $20,000.
Quebec Family Allowance: 1997
The benefit initially paid $975 per child in 1997, with an extra $1,300 for the first child of a single-parent family. It is reduced with family income in two tiers. First, at a rate of 25 percent (35% for singles with one child) until a minimum benefit level is reached. Following that, it is reduced at a rate of 5 percent for incomes higher than $50,000. This benefit was decreased to $625 per child by 2000. This benefit was introduced at the same time as changes to social assistance rates.
Saskatchewan Child Benefit: 1998
The benefit pays $720 for one child, an additional $924 for a second child, and $996 for a third or subsequent child. It is reduced with family income in excess of $15,921 at rates between 15 percent and 60.6 percent, depending on the number of children. This benefit was decreased each time the NCB Supplement was increased. Changes to social assistance rates were introduced at the same time as this benefit was introduced.
British Columbia Family Bonus: 1996
Each child entitles the parent to $1,332 per year, from which the National Child Benefit Supplement amount is subtracted. The Bonus is reduced with family income in excess of $18,000 at a rate of 8 percent for families with one child and 16 percent for families with two or more children. Provincial social assistance rates were reformed at the time the BC Family Bonus was introduced. Notes: Reported is the coefficient on NCBSCLAW scaled in thousands of 2000 Canadian dollars. One, two, and three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. All specifications include dummies for year, province, number of children, age of woman, education level, and presence of a child under age 6. In the third column there are second-order interactions betweeen province, year, and presence of children dummies. In the fourth column there are secondorder interactions between province, year, and number of children dummies. One, two, and three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. All specifications include dummies for year, province, number of children, age of woman, education level, and presence of a child under age 6. There are second-order interactions betweeen province, year, and family size dummies. Notes: Reported are the coefficients on the noted policy variables, scaled in thousands of 2000 Canadian dollars. One, two, and three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. The control variables are the same as in Table 4 , column 4. NCBSCLAW, WORKBENS, and AUTOBENS are instrumented using the set of policy instruments.
